Monthly Archives: June 2011

Vicious circles

Dalrymple’s May 25th BMJ column is a testament to the impressive literary output of Dr Jamieson Boyd Hurry (1857-1930):
In 1926 Dr Hurry published a study of Imhotep, the ancient Egyptian architect and doctor, who was also the chief minister of the pharaoh, Zoser. Imhotep was later deified, and in the Hellenic period his cult was amalgamated with that of Aesculapius. Dr Hurry, who knew hieroglyphics and was acquainted with the most famous British Egyptologist of his day, Sir Wallis Budge, was such an admirer of Imhotep that he dedicated his book to his memory.
From the purely medical point of view, it is not easy to see upon what Dr Hurry based his admiration for Imhotep. He was known to have been the architect of the first pyramid, and Dr Hurry writes that Imhotep was “a fine type of scholar-physician,” who “rendered service both to the bodies and spirits of the sick and afflicted to whom it was his privilege to minister.” On the other hand he admits, “Unhappily, nothing is known of his work as a physician.” I am reminded of what a Peruvian peasant said when asked why he had voted for Alberto Fujimori: “Because I know nothing about him.”

Safety in death

We’ve fallen behind again in posting Dalrymple’s British Medical Journal columns. On May 18th he discussed the early deaths of famous poets, particularly Rupert Brooke:
Rupert Brooke died aged 27 in 1915, and his books immediately went through many impressions: more, I suspect, than if he had survived. His most famous poems are the five sonnets he wrote in 1914 in which he seems to dwell on the noble sacrifice of youth in war: “These laid the world away; poured out the red / Sweet wine of youth; gave up the years to be / Of work and joy, and that unhoped serene, / That men call age …”
He suggested that in dying, men were achieving the highest kind of safety: “Safe shall be my going, / Secretly armed against all death’s endeavour; / Safe though all safety’s lost; safe where men fall; / And if these poor limbs die, safest of all.”
Because Brooke was a convinced atheist without any belief in an afterlife, eternal oblivion seemed to be his conception of the highest good or at least the highest security; though, in contradiction, he often extolled the beauty of existence, the sheer joy of living. We should remember that he was a poet, not a philosopher.

Connoting without denoting

Dalrymple’s essay for the June issue of The New Criterion is available online, and it’s his best takedown of the modern art world and its foundations in the radical, left-wing academy. This hornet’s nest of anger and resentment produces art that is ugly, uninspiring, solipsistic and overtly and almost solely political, and its members justify and defend their art using what we refer to here as “intentionally impenetrable and pseudo-scientific jargon”.
Dalrymple provides a good example by quoting from the catalogue that accompanies an exhibit at the Whitworth Art Gallery in Manchester:

This revolutionary experiment provided an alternative means of imagining events and its effect: in the gap left by splitting apart the image of the maternal body from that of her child, the temporality of the objects displayed emerges as an aesthetic device, in which the process of collection and the presentation of objects plays a key part, tracing the process of change but holding time in suspense, stretching out, in its document’s materiality, into the future.

What does he make of this “higher drivel”?

For the authors, “profundity” is by definition polysyllabic: it means something too precious to be exposed to the uninitiated by the vulgar employment of the right word in the right place. Language is, for them, the iconostasis that preserves the holiness of the sanctuary within; only the clergy may enter, the congregation remaining strictly without, uncomprehending but adoring—preferably adoring because uncomprehending.

…Only state-dominated education and funding of cultural institutions could have resulted in this prose, which, incidentally, makes that of Leonid Brezhnev seem like Mark Twain’s.

You can read the essay here (purchase required)

The Baseness of Acid

In his speech honoring Dalrymple, Bart de Wever disagreed with Dalrymple’s frequent rejection of the label of philosopher. “Although Theodore Dalrymple has always stated that he is not a philosopher but a social critic, I do believe in the profound philosophical qualities of his work,” De Wever said.

Those qualities are in evidence in his latest essay for The New English Review, in which he sorts through the philosophical questions inherent in the act of punishment. He says that the appropriateness of a certain form of punishment is determined both by relative considerations like proportionality and by absolute ones like the avoidance of brutality but that utilitarian considerations also play a part.

Read the essay here

The Gustave de Molinari Lecture

We mentioned in an earlier post that the Belgian think tank Libera! awarded Dalrymple its Laudatio Prize of Liberty, which they award for “special merit in the fight for freedom”. The group has just posted the speeches from that event online.

There is a speech in Dutch by Kristof Van der Cruysse, the President of Libera!, here. Perhaps a Dutch-speaking reader could summarize it for us?

Dalrymple was introduced by Bart De Wever, the president of the largest political party in Belgium and the man who by rights should perhaps be Prime Minister of the country. De Wever considers Dalrymple his intellectual mentor, and several statements from his speech are worthy of note.

On the main lesson of Dalrymple’s work:
“Social policies need to focus on the empowerment of people, if you really want to help them.”

On the essay (“Fans behaving badly are at the heart of selfish England”) that first got De Wever’s attention: “It cut straight to the heart of the social premises that founded the Purple government and therefore demonstrated to me that it was possible to translate a traditional liberal and moderate conservative discourse in a modern and socially relevant way. The publication of Life at the Bottom a year later strengthened that conviction and probably laid the foundation for my own modest attempts of being a columnist.”

On Dalrymple’s efforts fighting moral relativism: “I believe the significance of Theodore Dalrymple’s writings lie exactly in the exposure of this ideological masquerade. With every essay, another sham of political correctness is debunked. At the turn of the century, this was unheard of, maybe even unthinkable. Dr. Dalrymple was one of the first to voice an opposing opinion in a compulsive intellectual climate. He had obstacles to overcome and still is as much praised as lauded.”

De Wever’s speech is here.

Dalrymple’s Gustave de Molinari Lecture in acceptance of the award summarizes his criticisms of modern Western political thought, mostly by reference to Great Britain. I found these passages most interesting:



I have conducted little research that could be called scientific, and I am certainly not an academic. And I haven’t really even formulated a consistent philosophy or even tried to do so. And lack of theoretical rigour is an accusation often brought, perhaps justly, against British intellectual life and tradition, which is marked by an unformed empiricism. However, there are also certain advantages to such a tradition (which incidentally is now dying out, much to my own country’s detriment), one of the advantages being a refusal to view reality through the lens of an arcane and elaborate and much cherished theory…


Well, let me tell you what I regard as my most fundamental discovery (I mean it was a discovery for me, and not for anyone else in the rest of the world) that nevertheless quite a lot of people still find deeply shocking: that poor people, whether they be poor in the absolute or relative sense, are fully conscious human beings who are endowed with the capacity to think, to calculate, desire, make decisions and so forth, in the same way that more fortunately placed people do… [We] ought never to forget that those consequences [of being poor] are greatly affected and modified by the mentality of the poor, and that this mentality is itself affected not merely by material but more importantly by cultural circumstances, and above all by ideas.


Dalrymple’s speech is here.

Counsel of Despair

Mrs Lesley Pilkington of Hertfordshire, England was found guilty of ethical violations by the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy after a journalist wearing a recording device and pretending to be a patient denounced her for attempting to cure his homosexuality. Dalrymple turns the tables on the accuser in an excellent piece in the Salisbury Review:
What this man did was dangerous, at least if it is taken as model to be followed or is in any way rewarded, because it so powerfully undermines the trust that is essential to civilised (and sincere and truthful) social and professional intercourse.
….
A camera or sound recorder is a permanent witness, but not necessarily a truthful one. For it is not true that a camera and a sound recorder never lie: not only can what they record be edited, but what is ironical can easily be made to appear literal, what is humorous can be made flippant, and what is straightforwardly minatory can be made menacing or threatening.
A lot is written about the trust patients must have in their doctors, much less about the trust that doctors must have in their patients, at least if the medical enterprise is not to be merely the first act of a legal drama.
The article doesn’t seem to be available online at the Salisbury Review site, but it is available in its entirety here. You may purchase the entire issue of the Salisbury Review for only $3.

Murder Most Academic

Dalrymple has a new essay for City Journal that discusses Stephen Griffiths, the violent British criminal and diagnosed psychopath who was accepted by the University of Bradford into its doctoral program in “homicide studies” (at taxpayer expense) and then became a serial killer. Dalrymple touches on the institutional and intellectual climate in which such a thing can occur, but his essay focuses more on the British media’s characterization of Griffith’s victims not as “prostitutes” (which they mostly were) but as “sex workers” who were supposedly not engaged in what everyone knows to be an inherently risky and sordid activity. In the process, Dalrymple offers one of his most concise descriptions of the modern liberal mind:


What lies behind these mental contortions? It is a form of sentimentality, a mask for a deeper indifference, according to which people who suffer or have led unhappy lives must be transformed into blameless victims so that we can pity them. It is as if, were they to have contributed in any way to their own situation, all sympathy for them would have to be withdrawn or abandoned. And since the liberal wants to be seen, particularly by his peers, as a man superior in compassion to everyone else, he uses all his powers of rationalization, generally increased by many years of education, to establish that such and such a group of people is without blame and thus suitably—indeed, necessarily—an object of his moral generosity. If, in the process, he comes to conclusions repugnant to common sense, so much the worse for common sense.

Read it here

Hat Tip:  Mary C. and Shishir Y.